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[69 C.2d 585; 12 Cal.Rptr. 886. 446 P.2d 10061

[L. A. No. 29534. In Bank.

Nov. 18, 1968.]

ATLANTIC OIL COMPANY et a1., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et a1., Defendants
and Appellants.
HUMBLE OIL & REFINING COMPANY et a1., Plaintiffs
and Appellants, v. CITY OF LONG BEACH, Defendant
and Appellant.
(Consolidated Cases.)
[L. A. No. 29535.

In Bank.

Nov. 18, 1968.]

HAMMIL OIL CORPORATION et a!., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE et al., Defendants and
Respondents.
[la, Ib] Oil-Na.ture of Property in OiI.-The owner of land does
not have an absolute title to oil and gas in place as corporeal
property, but, rather, the exclusive right on his premises to
drill for oil and gas, and to retain as his property all substances brought to the surface on his land; thus under instruments denominated as leases, orders, or permits, each public
entity executing the same granted the privilege of drilling for
and producing oil and gas exclusively to a lessee without reservation or exception for the term of the lease, a profit a
prendre, a right to remove a part of the substance of the land,
, and received tbe right to specified oil and gas royalty pay\ ments, a right classified as an incorporeal hereditament, an
interest in land, where each instrument conveyed to a lessee
the exclusive right to drill for and extract oil, gas, and other
hydrocarbons from beneath specified publicly owned land,
together with necessary surface occupancy and access rights,

[lJ Oil and gas royalty as real or personal property, notes, 101
A.L.R. 884, 131 A.L.R. 1371. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Oil and Gas,
§ 3 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Gas and Oil, § 3 et seq.
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Oil, § 2; [2] Estates, § 1; [3] Taxation, § 53; (4, 5, 7, 9, 25, 26] Taxation, § 59; [6] Taxation § 60 ;
(8] Statutes, §180(2); [10,12,13,21] Taxation, §191(1); [11]
Taxation, § 186; [14] Landlord and Tenant, § 139 ; Words and
Phrases; (15, 17] Oil, § 30; [16] Oil, §§ 29, 30; [18] Oil, § 28;
(19] Cotenancy, § 31; [20] Oil, § 17; [22] Taxation, § 288(2) ;
[23] Cotenancy, § 12; [24] Cotenancy, § 13; [27] Taxation, § 288
(1).
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and entitled the public entity to a percentage or fraction of
production, to be taken either in kind or in cash.
[2] Estates-Profit a Prendre.-A profit a prendre is an interest
in real property in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament;
whether utllimited as to duration or limited to a term of years,
it is an estate in real property; if for a term of years, it is a
chattel real, which is nevertheless an estate in real property,
although not real property, or real estate; if unlimited in
duration, it is a freehold interest, an estate in fee, and real
property or real estate.
[8] Taxation-Real Properly.-For purposes of taxation, the definitions of real property in the revenue and taxation laws of the
state control whether or not they conform to definitions used
for other purposes.
[4] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Mining or Oil Interests.-Although
classified under general concepts of property law as an incorporeal hereditament and an interest in lands, the right to re" ceive oil royalties is not classified as real property for purposes
of taxation.
[6] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Mining or Oil Intetests.-The right
to receive royalties is not a right appertaining to minerals
"in the land," but rather, an interest in oil and gas when they
are removed from the land and reduced to possession; the purpose" of the qualifying phrase "in the land," as used in Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 104, defining real property to include "all minerals
in the land" is to differentiate royalty interests in extraeted
minerals from interests in minerals still in the land, and only
the latter, which include the right to drill for and extract oil
and gas from the land, are real property for tax purposes.
[6] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Real Property-Possessory Rights.
-The purpose of Rev. & Tax. Code, § 107, dealing with possessory interests in real estate, is to distinguish between those
possessory interests that must be placed on the unsecured roll
and such interests that must be placed on the secured roll;
and a nonoperating oil royalty nonpossessory interest is not an
incorporeal hereditament within the meaning of Rev. " Tax.
Code, § 107.
[7a, 7b] Id.-Real Property-Mining o.r Oil Interests.-The rule
of contemporaneous construction may not be applied .when the
wording of a statute or ordinance clearly calls for a different
construction; thus an administrative interpretation that oil
royalty interests were l·ights and privileges appertaining to
minerals in the land within the meaning of Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 104, and taxable thereunder unless held by a tax-exempt
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 53; Am.Jur., Taxation (1st ed
§416).
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entity, was not binding where the wording of the statute
clearly called for a different construction.
[8] Statutes-Interpretation-Aid to Construction-Contemporaneous Executive or Departmental Construction.-Although
contemporaneous construction by officials charge<l with the
administration of a statute or ordinance is given great weight,
final responsibility for the interpretation of the law rests with
the courts, and, at most, administrative practice is a weight in
the scale to be considered but not to be inevitably followed.
[9] Taxation - Real Property - Leaseholds - Oil Interests.A landowner's royalty interest under an oil and gas lease or
similar agreement is not real property within the meaning of
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 104, defining real property, and failure to
deduct its value in assessing the interest of a lessee of taxexempt land does not result in imposing a tax on tax-exempt
property.
[10] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leaseholds.-In valuing rights
to produce oil and gas, under leases and similar agreements
with the owners of tax-exempt land, by the capitalization of
income method, a generally accepted method of valuing property from which income may be or is derived, the present value
of the lessor's royalty interest is not to be deducted in arriving
at a net income figure.
[11] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-Taxation
of property at its value without regard to the owner's equity
therein is an established principle of ad valorem taxation.
[12] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Possessory Estates in Real
Property.-A conditional vendee or a mortgagor is taxable at
\
the full value of property as its owner even though he could
, realize little or nothing by its sale.
[18] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Possessory Estates in Real
Property.-A continued enjoyment of the benefits of ownership of the fee or a possessory interest is dependent on discharging the obligations assumed to secure such benefits, and
there is no logical basis for treating those obligations differently as they happen to run to a lessor, a conditional vendor,
or a mortgagee.
[14] Landlord and Tenant-Definition and Nature of Rent: Words
and Phrases-"Rent."-Rent paid for a leasehold interest is
part of the cost or purchase price of the leasehold and is a
compensation paid for the use of land; it need not be money,
and any chattels or products of the soil serve the purpose
equally as well.
[10J See Cal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 186; Am. Jur., Taxation
ed §712).
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[15] Oil-Leases-Royalties.-RoYlllty payments are a consideration to the lessor for the uses of land allowed by contract;
and under the usual oil and gus lease, the owner confers on
the lessee for thc term of the lease an exclusive right of profit
to drill for and produce oil, the lessee usually returning to the
lessor for the privilege granted, a rent or royalty measured by
a fraction of the oil produced.
[16] Id.-Leases-Rent: Royalties.-The words "royalty" and
"rent" are used interchangeably to convey the same meaning,
i.e., the compensation which the occupier pays the landlord for
that species of occupation which the contract between them
allows; and in this respect it is immaterial that the lessor obtains title to royalty oil and gas as soon as it is produced at
the wellhead, whcreas rental payments are usually made from
funds initially owned by the lessee.
[17] Id.-Leases-Royalties.-The owner of land has no title to
oil and'gas in place but only the exclusive right to produce it
from his land; when he conveys that right to a lessee in exchange for the right to receive a fraction of the oil and gas
produced, his royalty interest, like the right to receive rent
pursuant to other kinds of leases, flows from the agreement of
thc parties; and the fact that the oil and gas would have becn
the lessor's personal propcrtybad there been no lease and had
the oil and gas bel.'l1 produced by him does not change the character of his relationship with the lessee or the nature of the
royalty payment us cOll1pensation for the use of land.
[lSa, ISb] Id.-Cotenancy.-A city and the United States were
tenants in common in thc exclusive right to drill for and produce oil and gas from land, where the city assigned to the
United States 6%, percent (If thc amount or value of any oil
and gas that might be produced from certain of its lands;
subsequent oil and gas lessees under city leases providing for
payment of royalties plus a percentage of net pro1l.ts after
payout were obligated to make royalty payments to co-lessors
instead of a single lessor, and their obligation to pay the 6%
percent royalty to the United States constituted part of the
consideration for their right to produce oil and gas from the
land, although the United States did not sign the lease.
[19] Ootenancy-Tenancy in Oommon-Lease or License by 00tenant.-A single cotenant may confcr occupancy rights upon
a third person.
[20] Oil-Leases-By Cotenant.-Wben one tenant in common
makes an oil and gas lease, it binds. the other tenants in COlnmon who ratify the lease, and acceptance of benefits under the
lease constitutes ratification.
[21J Taxation-Leaseholds-Mode of Valuation.-Royalty payments to the state under a cOlllpensatory royalty agreement
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were compensation for interest in land and analogous to rental
payments under the rule that in valuing an oil lease for taxation by the capitalization of income method, future rents are
not to be deducted in arriving at a net income figure, where
the state owned land adjacent to privately owned land 011
which a lessee had an oil and gas lease and, under the compensatory royalty agreement, promised it would not drill, or permit others to drill, any well for the production of oil and gas
on its land, in return for payment of a percentage of all oil
produced and sold from wells drilled by the lessee under its
lease on the adjoining privately owned land, and where, under
the compensatory royalty agreement the lessee obtained interestH in the state-owned land-the right to exclude others from
drilling any well for the production of oil and gas thereon,
and an easement and rights-of-way over the land.
[22a,22b] ld.-Remedies of Taxpayer-Recovery of Taxes PaidJudgment.-In a suit to recover taxes based on improper assessments, the trial eourt erred in holding invalid the assessments of plaintiff's interests under an oil drilling and operating contract on the ground that the royalty interests thereunder should have been deducted in making the assessments.
where the contract did not create a tenancy in eommon in the
taxable lIIineral interests in such real property, but rather
granted plaintiff the exclusive right to drill for and produce
oil and gas without indicating any intent that less than a full
profit a prendre was granted, and where the facts that the
instrument was labeled a drilling and operating agreement
rather than a lease, that plaintiff was labeled a contractor who
was to be paid for services performed, and that the parties
disclaimed any intent to grant an interest in property, did not
cont.rol the legal effect of the instrument.
[23] Cotenancy-Tenancy in Common-Creation of Relation.-A
tenancy in common in a taxable mineral interest consisting of
the right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons exists only if
both tenants have a unity of possession in the same estate, and
the intention to create such unity of possession must clearly
appear.
[24] ld.-·Tenancy in Common-Creation by Conveyance, Purchase or Sale.-When a landowner conveys to another the exclusive right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons in return
for sOllie part of the pl'oduction or its cash equivalent, he does
not therl'hy hecome a tenant in common in the profit a prendrp,
for he has not inllicated an intention to retain the right to
take part in tl:e extmction of hydrocarbons.
[26] Taxation-Subjects of Taxation-Mining or Oil Interests.An agreement to share or ret.ain title to the oil and gas re-
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duced to possession does not constitute an agreement to share
the taxable mineral interest in the real property.
[26] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Oil lnterests.-The provisions of
oil and gas agreements did not indicate an intention tQ create
a tenancy in common in the taxable mineral interests consisting of the right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons, but
indicated instead an intention to grant oil companies a profit
a prendre subject to conditions and controls retained by a
city landowner to assure that publicly owned oil resources were
developed in a manner that would best serve the public interest, where the instruments granted a taxable mineral interest exclusively to the oil companies for a period certain, with
a reversion· thereafter to the city, and where, although the
controls retained by the city allowed it to supervise operation
for its own protection, they did not allow it to undertake
such operations itself.
[27] ld. - Remedies of Taxpayer - Recovery of Taxes PaidFindings.-In a suit to recover taxes based on improper assessments, the trial court correctly concluded that a city landowner becallle a tenant in common with two oil companies
in taxable mineral interests in the land and that the latter's
interests should be asscsscd accordingly, where by unit agreements and oil drilling and operating contracts referring to
unitization, the city adjusted its relationship with each of the
plaintiffs involved so that previously granted exclusive rights
to drill for and produce oil and gas would be delegated to
a common agent, both the city and plaintiffs involved were
working interest owners, both voted in proportion to their
adjusted interests and their l'elative interests in the entire
tract cOlllmitted to unit operation, and the right to drill for
and produce oil and gas, which comprised the taxable mineral
interest, was no longer held exclusively by a single oil contractor, but rather both plaintiffs involved and the city controlled the drilling and production of oil and gas on the subject
land in proportion to their voting rights in the unit and
thereby subscribed to that unity of possession required to
create a tenancy in colllmon in the taxable mineral estate.

APPEAL, in L. A. No. 29534, from a judgment of the
Ruperior Court of Los Angeles County, Leon T. David, .Judge.
]{pversed in part and affirmt'd in part.
APPEAlJ, in lJ. A. No. 29535, from a judgmrnt of the
Ruperior Court of Orange County. H. C. Cameron, Judge.
Affirmed.
Consolidated actions by plaintiff taxpayers to recover taxes
allegedly based on improper assessments. That portion of
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judgment for defendants in L. A. No. 29534 dealing with
assessments of interest under the Standard contract is reversed with directions, in all other respects affirmed; judgment for defendant in L. A. No. 29535 affirmed.
Hanna & Morton, Harold C. Morton, John H. Blake and
Edward S. Renwick for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
John D. Maharg, County Counsel (Los Angeles), John D.
Cahill, Deputy County Counsel, Leonard Putnam, Cit.y Attorney, Kenneth K. Williams, Deputy Cit.y Attorney, Hill, Farrere & Burrill, Carl A. Stutsman, .Jr., Vincent C. Page, .Jack
R. White, Keil & Connolly, George A. Connolly, Richard DoJ~,
Adrian Kuyper, County Counsel (Orange), and Robl'rt F.
Nuttman, Assistant County. Counsel, for Defendants and
Appellants and for Defendants and Respondents.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Jay L. Shavelson,
Assistant Attorney General, and Phillip G. Samovar, Deputy
Attorney General, as Amici Curiae in L. A. 29534.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In these consolidated appeals plaintiff
taxpayers seek to recover taxes that they claim were based on
improper assessments. Both plaintiffs and defendants in L.A.
29534, appeal from a judgment upholding 46 assessments and
invalidating three assessments by the County of Los Angeles
and the City of Long Beach for the tax year of 1963-64. The
\ State Lands Commission of the State of California appears as
\amicus curiae in support of two of those plaintiffs. In L.A.
'29535, plaintiffs appeal from a separate judgment upholding
37 assessments by the County of Orange for the tax year 196465.
The facts are not in dispute. By virtue of various documents, plaintiff oil operators obtained from tax-exempt governmental entities rights to drill for and extract oil, gas, and
other hydrocarbons from specified public lands, together with
necessary surface occupancy and access rights. The documents
grant such rights for specified periods and are variously
denominated leases, orders, permits, agreements, and drilling
and operating contracts. Each provides that the governmental
entity owning the property is to receive a percentage or fraction of production payablc ill cash or in kind.
Plaintiffs' rights in the public lands are admittedly subject
to ad valorem property taxes as mining rights or mineral

)

)

592

ATLANTIC

OIL

Los

CO. V. COUNTY OF
ANGELES

[69 C.2d

rights. Assessors for defendant cities and counties employ the
capitalization of income method of assessing these rights. 1
Before 1963 the County of Los Angeles and the City of Long
Beach assessed such rights by estimating the present value of
the oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons expected to be recovered
over the anticipated duration of each agreement and subtracting therefrom (1) the estimated present value of the anticipated costs of withdrawing those substances aud (2) the estimated present value of the sums that each plaintiff would be
required to pay the government entity owning the land in
money or in kind. The assessed value was derived by multiplying the fair market value by the ratio of assessed values to
fair market values prevailing generally throughout the t.axing
jurisdiction. Before 1964 the Orange County assessor employed a substantially similar method. 2 Each governmental
entity then applied the appropriate tax rate to the assessed
value to compute the taxes. 3
After 1963 in Los Angeles County and the City of Long
Beach, and after 1964 in Orange County, the assessors no
longer excluded value attributable to the portion of production to be paid to governmental entities in calculating the fair
market· value of plaintiffs' interests. This change in assessment procedures resulted in a large increase in the assessed
value of plaintiffs' interests and a corresponding increase in
their taxes.~ After exhausting their administrative remedies,

,,Ii.
I'

I

I'·

II!h

Il.
I

II

1 With the exception of the City of Long Beach, eaeh defendant city
has entrusted to the appropriate agencies of defendants Los Angeles
County and Orange County the tasks of assessing property for purposes
of municipal taxation, equalizing and correcting assessments, and collecting the taxes. The City of Long Beach assesses and collects its own ad
valorem taxes.
2Before 1964 the Ot'ange County assessor employed a procedUre that
had the same effe<·t of exeJuding value attributable to the portion of production to be pnid to government entities. He calculated an assessed
value per barrel of oil, produced by determining an average weighted
price per barrel of oil, subtracting a per barrel cost of production there·
from, /lnd multiplying the result by a capitalization factor adjusted t.o
refie(·t the ratio of fair market value to assessed value. He then multiplied the resulting assessed value per barrel of oil by the difference be·
tweE'n the estimntp(] number of barrels of oil to be produced and the
number of barrels equivalent to the value of the payments to the government entity OWllir.g the land.
3Many of the documents gmnting oil rights contain tax provisions.
Some merely state that plaintiffs are to pay all mineral taxes levied on
their interests; others provided for sharing the taxes according to the
respective percentages of proiluction to which each party is entitled.
"In 1967 the Legislature added sections 107.2 and 107.3 to the Revenue
and Taxation Coile to define the full cash value of certain leasehold
estates in exempt property for the produetion of gas, petroleum and other
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plaintiffs filed actions seeking recovery of taxes resulting from
the increased assessments and declaratory relief. In L.A.
29534, the superior court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs with respect to three assessments of mineral rights
granted under documents entitled "drilling and operating
contracts," but otherwise sustained the method of valuation
employed by the County of Los Angeles assessor and the City
of Long Beach assessor. In L.A. 29535, the superior court
sustained the method of valuation employed by the Orange
County assessor in all cases, including his assessment of rigl1ts
under a "drilling and operating contract" similar to thosc in
L.A. 29534.
Leases, Orders, and Permits
[Ia] We first consider the instruments, denominated as
leases,s orders, or permits. 6 Each conveys to a lessee the
exclusive right to drill for and extract oil, gas, and other
hydrocarbons from beneath specified, publicly owned land,
together with necessary surface occupancy and access rights.
Some instruments convey those rights for a fixed term, and
others for so long as oil and gas are produced in paying
quantities. Each instrument entitles the lessor to a percentage
or fraction of production, to be taken either in kind or in
cash.'
The nature of the rights created by such instruments is

\

hydrocarbon substances. (Stats. 1967. ch. 1684, U 1, 2.) Chapter 1684
also provided that it should not be construed to affect this litigation.
(§ 3.)
IiNine of the leases were granted by the United States Department of
the Interior. Thirteen were granted by various city and county governments. Fifteen are" community" leases, granted by adjoining owners of
relatively small parcels of land, some of whom arc govemmental entities,
who have pooled their interests so that their holdings may be developed
jointly. The remainder arc oil and gas leascs grantcd by the State of
California.
6Eight of the instruments are denominated "orders" or "perm its"
from the Board of Harbor Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles.
The trial court noted that "Because of the trusts upon harbor lund~
imposed by the City Charter, sections 141(6), 142 and 143a, the use of
such lands for drilling and production of oil is under a 'permit' rather
than a 'lease.' " Since the provisions contained therein are substantially
identical with those found in leases, we regard the orders and permits as
being in the same category as leases. (Cf. Dutton v. Interstate Inv. Corp.
(1941) 19 Ca1.2d 65, 68 [119 P.2d ]38]; Morrow v. Coast Land Co.
(1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 92, 110·111 [84 P.2d 301 ].)
'Yost of the instruments allow the lessor to choose the form of pay·
ment; some require him to take payment in cash. Cash value is based
upon the current market price of oil, the best price available, or similar
formulae specified in the agreement.
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scttled in California. " [T]hc owncr of land does not have an
absolute title to oil and gas in place as corporeal real
propt'rty, but, rather, the exclusive right on his premises to
drill for oil and gas, and to retain as his property all substances brougllt to the surface on his land." (Oallahan v
Mar·tin (1935) 3 Ca1.2d 110, 117 [43 P.2d 788, 101 A.L.R.
871]. See also La Laguna Ranch 00. v. Dodge (1941) 18
Cal.2d 132, 135 [114 P.2d 351, 135 A.L.R. 546] ; Gerhard v .
. Stephens (1968) 68 Ca1.2d 864, 879-880 [69 Cal.Rptr. 612,
442 P.2d 692].)
Under the instruments llcrein, each public entity granted
t.he privilege of drilling for and producing oil and gas exclusjvely to a lessee without reservation or exception for the term
of thc lease. "The right [to drill for and produce oil] wheJ.l
granted is a profit a prendre, a right to remove a part of the
substance of the land. [2] A profit a prendrre is an interest
in real property in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament. . .. The profit a prendre, whcther it is ~nIimited as to
duration or limited to a term of years, is an iestate in real
property. If it is for a term of years, it is a chattel real, which
is nevertheless an estate in real property, although not real
property; or real estate. [Citation omitted.] Where it is
unlimited in duration, it is a freehold interest, an estate in
fee, and real property or real estate." (Dabney-Johnston Oil
Corp. v. Walden (1935) 4 Ca1.2d 637, 649 [52 P.2d 237]. See
also Oallahan v. Martin, supra. 3 Cal.2d 110, 118; Gerhard v.
Stephens, supra, 68 Ca1.2d 864, 879-880.) Each lessor retained a rcversionary intcrest, the right to drill for and produce oil and gas after tIle period specified in the lease. (Dabney-Johnston Oil Oorp. v. Walden, supra, 4: Ca1.2d 637,
647.) [1b] Each lessor also received the right to specified
oil and gas royalty payments, a right that we have classified
as an incorporeal hereditament, an interest in land. (See Oal- .
lahan v. Martin, supra, 3 Ca1.2d 110, 124; Standard Oil 00. v.
J. 1'. Mills Organization (1935) 3 Ca1.2d 128, 134 [43 P.2d
797] ; Dabney-Johnston Oil Oorp. v. Walden, supra, 4 Ca1.2d
637,647.)
[3] It is scttled, howevcr, "that for purposes of taxation
the definitions of real property in the revenue and taxation
laws of the state control whetl1er they conform to definitions
used for other purposes or not." (Trabue Pittman Oorp. v.
Oounty of Los Angeles (1946) 29 Ca1.2d 385, 393 [175 P.2d
512] ; see also San Diego Trust &; Sav. Bank v. Oounty of San
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Diego (1940) 16 Cal.2d 142, 147 [105 P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R.
416].) Section 104 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides that" 'Real estate' or 'real property' includes: (a)
The possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the possession of land. (b) All mines, minerals, and quarries in the
land, all standing timber whether or not belonging to the
owner of the land, and all rights and privileges appertaining
thereto. . . . ' '8 Plaintiffs' rights in the public lands are
admittedly subject to ad valorem property taxes as "mining
rights" or "mineral rights" (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 201, 104,
607.5), and it is those interests that defendants claim they
assessed. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the lessors' interests in land resulting from the rights to royalties are classified
as real property by state tax laws, and that such interests are
therefore part of the bundle of rights tbat constitutes the
llydrocarbon mineral estate for ad valorem tax purposes.
Accordingly, they conclude that failure to deduct the present
value of royalty payments in computing the value of theil'
interests results in taxation to them of rights owned by' tax
exempt lessors,
[4] Altbough it is classified under general concepts of
property law as an incorporeal hereditament and an intert'st
in land, we conclude tbat the right to receive royalties is not
classified as real property for purposes of taxation. [5] Section 104 of the Revenue and Taxation Code defines real
property to include "all . . . minerals . . . in the lU1Jd,
. . . and all rights and privileges appertaining thereto." As
noted above, in California the right to receive royalties is not
a right appertaining to minerals "in tbe land." Rather, it is
an interest in oil and gas when tbey are removed from the
land and reduced to possession. The purpose of the qualifying
phrase" in the land" is to differentiate such royalty interests
in extracted minerals from interests in minerals still in the
land. 9 Only the latter, which include the right to drill for and
BSection 2500.17 of the Long Beach Municipal Code contains almost
identical language.
9Plaintiil's cite S11effield v. Hogg (1934) 124 Tex. 290, 310 [77 S.W.2d
1021, 1030] as an example of a contrary construction of an almost idell'
tical statute. Texas courts, however, have adopted the doctrine of title
to oil and gas in place, under which the royalty holder owns his percent·
age sllare of oil and gas in the ground. (See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Daugllerl!l
(1915) 107 Tex. 226 [176 S.W. 717, L.R.A. 1917F 989]; Sheffield v.
Hogg, supra, 124 Tex. 290, 298.) An interpretation based on that theory
is no authority in California, which has rejected the doctrine of title to
oil and gas in place. (See, e.g., Callallan v. Martin, supra, 3 Ca1.2d 110,
116·117; Gerhard v. Stephens, supra, 68 Ca1.2d 864, 878.)
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extract oil and gas from the land, are real property for tax
purposes. IO
The history of section 607.5 of the Revenue and Taxation
Codc also indicates that the I.Jegislature did not include the
right. to share iu tIle proceeds of oil and gas after they are
produced as one of the rights and privileges apperhlining to
minerals in the land. Section 607.5 provides: "In the event
that a separate assessment of rights and privileges appertaining to mines or minerals and land is made, the descriptive
words 'mining rights' or 'mineral rights' on the assessment
role shall include the right to enter in or upon the land for
the exploration, development, and production of minerals,
including oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons." On its face, the
statute does not restrict the meaning of "rights and privileges
appertaining to mines or minerals and land" to the right to
enter and produce oil, gas and other hydrocarbons, for the
"term 'indudes' is ordinarily' a word of enlargement and not
of limitation." (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42
Ca1.2d 621, 639 [268 P.2d 723].) Section 607.5 was enacted in
1955, however, apparently in response to two decisions by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal. In 1953 that court held that
the term." mining rights" was too vague to include oil rights
of any kind, and further stated tlmt "Even if any oil rights
were thought of by the ordinary person, in connection with
the term 'mining rights,' tIle right of a lessee to enter the
land and drill for oil would naturally be understood, rather
lOBefore the early 1940's, many county assessors separately assessed
royalty rights to oil and gas lessors, thereby implicity classifying such
rights as real property under section 3617 of the Political Code, the prede·
cessor of section 104 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. Plaintiffs contend that the Legislature adopted this interpretation of the statute by
frequently reenacting the relevant language in section 3617 without sig·
Ilificant modification during that period. (Sec, e.g., Stats. 1905, ch. 199,
§], p. 192; Stats. 1909, eh. 609, §], p. 919; Stats. 192], ch. 177, § I,
p. 185; Stats. 1925, eh. ] 2, § I, p. 11; Btats. 1929, ch. 54, § I, p. 124.)
During that period, however, the cases were in conflict, the character of
rights to subsurface oil WAS unclear lind IIssessors could therefore reasonably treat the lessor as the owner of his share of the oil and gas in the
ground. (Bee, e.g., Graciosa Oil Co. v. C01tnty of Santa Barbara (1909)
]55 Cal. 140, 145·146 [99 P. 483. 20 L.R.A. N.S. 211]; Associated Oil
Co. v. County of Orange (1935) ·1 Cn1.App.2d 5, 6 40 P.2d 887].) The
doctrine of title to oil and glls in place was not definitively rejected in
California until ]935 (see Callahan v. Martin, 81/,pra, 3 Cal.2d 110, 116·
117), and the Legislature last considered section 104 in 1939, after a
series of decisions by this court further defining and delineating rights
to sub-surface oil and gas. Under the circumstances, we cannot assume
that the Legislature adopted administrative interpretations ot section
3617 that may have reflected no more than uncertainty as to the nature of
oil and gas rights.
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than the right to share in the proceeds of oil after it is produced." (Alma Inv. Co. v. Krausse (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d
740,745-746 [256 P.2d 1017].) In 1954 the court again llelo
that the term "mining rights" did not necessarily includ . .
"ordinary oil rights." (Estribou v. Alma Inv. Co. (1954)
126 Cal.App.2d 61, 64 [271 P.2d 176].) Section 607.5 modifif's
the holdings of these cases. Had the Legislature deemed that
both nonoperating royalty interests and rights to enter land
and produce oil and gas are taxable mineral estates, it is
reasonable to assume that it would have said so by d('fillin~~
"mining rights" or "mineral rights" to include both types of
interests, not just the latter.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that to interpret s('ct.ion 104 to
exclude royalty interests is inconsistent with section 107 of
the Revenue and Taxation Code. l1 They point out that in
specifying the interests in gas, petroleum, and hydrocarbon
substances that should be placed on the secured roll, section
107 refers to "incorporeal hereditaments or profits a prendre." They urge that in this context an incorporeal hereditament must be something different from a profit a prendre and
conclude that the Legislature therefore used tIle \Voros "incorporeal hereditament" in section 107 to mean II nonoperating royalty interest. [6] Section 107, however, deals with
possessory interests, and its purpose is to distinguish between
those possessory interests that must be placed 011 t.lle lln8(,cured roll and sueh interests that must be placed on the
secured roll. Accordingly, since a nonoperating royalty interest is not a possessory interest, it is not an incorporeal hereditament within the meaning of section 107. Delaney v. LOll'CI'y
\

llSection 107 reads ill part : " 'Possessory iuterests' means the following: (a) Possession of, claim to, or right to the possession of land
or improvements, except when coupled with ownership of the lalld or
improvements in the same person. (b) 'faxable improvements 011 tax,
exempt land. Except as provided in this section, possessory interests shall
not be considered as sufficient security for the payment of any taxes,
Leasehold estates for the production of gas, petroleum and other hYllrocarbon substallces from beneath the surface of tile earth, and other rights
relating to such substances which constitute incorporeal hereditaments
or profits a prendre, are sufficient security for the payment of taxcs leviecl
thereon. Such estates and rights shall not he classified as possessory
interests, but shall be placed on the secured roll. " Revenue and Taxntion
Code section 109 provides in part: " 'RolJ' J1ll'aIlS the entire aSSeSSlllOllt
roll. The' secured roll' is til at part of the roll containing . . . prop<'rty
the taxes on which are a lien on real property sufficient, in the opinion
of the assessor, to secure payment of the taxes." Revenue and Taxation
Code section 2187 provides: "Every tax 011 real property is a lien ng:dllst
the property nssessed."
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(1944) 25 Cal.2d 561 [154 P.2d 674], is not to the contrary,
for the court was there concerned solely with the application
of section 107 to the interests of operating lessees under oil
and gas leases.
[7a] Plaintiffs contend that the uniform practice of assessors before 1963 of deducting royalties payable to a tax
exempt lessor in assessing the value of the lessee's interest
constitutes a settled administrative interpretation that royalty
interests are rights and privileges appertaining to minerals in
the land within the meaning of section 104. Plaintiffs assert
that it is only because such interests were held by tax exempt
lessors, that assessors in the past did not include their value
as part of the total t..uable value of the mineral estate. Plaintiffs conclude that we should give controlling weight to tllis
administrative interpretation.
As pointed out above (see fn. 10, supra) the assessors'
practice of treating royalty interests as taxable real property
under section 104 may have arisen out of uncertainty as to the
theory of the ownership of oil and gas rights. After that
theory was clarified in the 1930's, there was no compelling
need for assessors to reconsider their assessment practices
until this court's decision in De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of
San Diego (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 546, 566-570 [290 P.2d 544], disapproving the valuation methods approved in Blinn Lbr. Co.
v. County of Los Angeles (1932) 216 Cal. 468 [14 P.2d 516],
and Blinn Lbr. Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1932) 216 Cal.
474 (14 P.2d 512, 84 A.L.R. 1304]. (See also Texas Co. v.
County of Los A.·ngeles (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 55, 59-61 [338 P.2d
440].) In the case of privately owned land, the entire value of
the mineral estate is taxable, and liability for the payment of
taxes between the lessor and lessee is a subjeet for agreement
between them. Aecordingly, it is essentially only a matter of
bookkepping whether the assessor assesses the entire mineral
estate to the lessee or lessor or assesses their interests separately. In the case of land owned by tax exempt entities,
under the rule of the Blinn cases, the value of the royalty
interest was deducted in assessing the value of the taxable
lessee's interest, and it was therefore immaterial to the
assessor whether or not the royalty interest would have been
taxable under section 104 had the lessor not been tax exempt.
rl'he decision in the De Luz case made the question of such
taxability material, for royalty interests could no longer be
deducted uuder the valuation rule of the Blinn cases and the
question therefore arose whether royalty interests should be
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deducted as separate interests in real property under section
104. Even if we assume that the failure of assessors to apply
the De Lllz case to oil and gas leases for eight years after it
was decided was not the result of inertia, but constituted an
administrative interpretation that royalty interests are taxable under section 104 unless they are held by a tax
exempt entity, that interpretation would not be binding.
[8] "[A]lthough contemporaneous construction by officials
charged with the administration of a statute or ordinance is
given great weight, 'final responsibility for the interpretation
of the law rests with the courts. "At most administrative
practice is a weight in the scale, to be considered but not to be
inevitably followed.'" (Whitcomb Hotel v. California EtlIp.
Com., 24 Cal.2d 753,756-757 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. 405],
quoting from F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d
973.) [7b] The rule of contemporaneous construction may
not be applied when tIle wording of the statute or ordinance,
as in the present case, clearly calls for a different construction. (California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22
Cal.2d 287, 294 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028].)" (Johnston v. Board of Supervisors (1947) 31 Ca1.2d 66, 74-75 [187
P.2d 686]; see also GoodwiU Industries v. County of Los
Angeles (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 19,26 [254 P.2d 877].)
[9] We conclude that a landowner's royalty interest
under an oil and gas lease or similar agreement is not real
property within the meaning of section 104 and that therefore
failure to deduct its value in assessing the interest of a lessee
of tax exempt land does not result in imposing a tax on tax
exempt property.
[10] The remaining issues involve the valuation of plaintiffs' various operating interests. Defendants base their refusal to deduct the present value of future royalty payments
in assessing plaintiffs' interests on DeLuz Homes, Inc. v.
County of San Diego, supra, 45 Cal.2d 546, and Texas Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Ca1.2d 55. Although each of
those cases involved a surface lease and the question of the
deductibility of the present value of the lessor's right to
receive rent in assessing the value of the lessee's possessory
interest in tax exempt land, their rationale applies also to. the
question of the deductibility of the present value of royalty
interests in assessing plaintiffs' rights to produce oil and gas
under their leases and similar agreements with the owners of
tax exempt land.
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We recognized in the De Luz case that the capitalization of
ineome method is a "generally accepted method of valuing
propcrty from which income may be or is derived." (45
Ca1.2d 546, 564.)12 In both the De Luz and Texas Co. cases
WI' held that in valuing a surface lease by the capitalization of
inc·ome method, future rents are not to be deducted in arriving at a net income figure. (45 Ca1.2d 546, 566; 52 Cal.2d 55,
60-62.) [11] "Taxation of propcrty at its value without
regard to tlle owner's equity therein is an established .principIe of ad valorem taxation. [12] Thus, a conditional
vendee or a mortgagor is taxable at the full value of property
as its owner even though he could realize little or nothing by
its sale. (S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 569-570 [90
IJ.Ed. 851, 859-860, 66 S.Ct. 749] ; Eisley v. Mohan, 31 Cal.2d
637,643 [192 P.2d 5]; DcLuz Homes, Inc. v. Oounty of San
J)iego,45 Cal.2d 546, 573 [290 P.2d 544].) [13] The continued enjoyment of the benefits of ownership of the fee or a
possessory interest is dependent on discharging the obligations assumed to secure such benefits, and there is no logical
basis for treating those obligations differently as they happen
to run to a lessor, a conditional vendor, or a mortgagee."
(Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55,
62.)
The analogy between rents and royalties is well settled.
[14] ., Rent paid for a leasehold interest . . . is part of the
cost or purchase price of the lca.~ehold, . . . .. (De Luz
Homes, Inc. v. Oounty of San Diego, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 546,
567.) "'Rent is a compensation paid for the use of land. It
need not be money. Any chattels or products of the soil serve
the purpose equally as well. . . .' (Clarke & Oaine v. Oobb,
121 Cal. 595, 597 [54 P. 74]; . . . )" (Silveira v. Ohm (1949)
33 Ca1.2d 272,276 [201 P.2d 387].) [15] Similarly, royalty
payments are considl'ration to the lessor for the uses of land
12< < According to this method, the value of property is the sum of
anticipated future installments of net income from the property, less an
allowance for interest and the risk of partial or no receipt. . . . The first
step in the process is to d<>terminc prospective net income and this is
done by estimating future gross income and deducting therefrom expected
nccess:n'y expenseR incidcnt to maintcnan"e and operation of the property . . . . Since it is generally accepted tlmt a person who agrees to
receive payment in th(' future is entitled to interest both for waiting and
the risk of partial or no receipt, the second step is to discount each future
installment of income by a rate of interl'st that takes into account the
llazards of the iuvestment aud tIll' ae.cepted eoncl'pts of a 'fair return.'
The sum of the discollnted installments is the present value of the property." (De Luz Ho'1l'cs, 17lc. v. County of San Diego, aupra, 45 Ca1.2d
546, 564-565.)
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allowed by contract. "Under the usual oil and gas lease the
owner confers on the lessee for the term of the lease an exclusive right of profit to drill for and produce oil, the lessee
usually returning to the lessor for the privilpge grantrd a rent
or royalty measured by a fraction of the oil produced."
(Dabney-J ohnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 637,
649; see also Standard Oil Co. v. J. P. Mills Organization,
supra, 3 Cal.2d 128, 134-135.) Thus in Callahan v. Martin,
supra, 3 Ca1.2d 110, 123, the case in which we rejected the
theory of ownership of oil and gas in place, we recognized
that "royalty return . . . is rent, or so closely analogous as
to partake of the incidents thereof." [16] "The words
'royalty' and 'rent' . . . 'are used interchangeably to convey
the same meaning'; i.e., 'the compensation which the occnpier
pays the landlord for that species of occupation which the
contract between them allows' (Nelson v. Republic Iron d\SteeZ Co. (1917) 240 F. 285, 291, 293 [153 C.C.A. 211] ; Elsinore Oil Co. v. Signal Oil etc. Co. (1935) 3 Cal.App.2d 570,
573 [40 P.2d 523])." (Denio v. City of Huntington Beach
(1943) 22 Cal.2d 580,596 [140 P.2d 392, 149 A.L.R. 3201.) In
this respect it is immaterial that the lessor obtains title to
royalty oil and gas as soon as it is produced at the wellhead,
whereas rental payments are usually made from funds initially owned by the lessee. [17] The owner of land has no title
to oil and gas in place but only the exclusive right to produce
it from his land. When he conveys that right to a lessee in
exchange for the right to receive a fraction of the oil and gas
produced, his royalty interest, like the right to receive rent
pursuant to other kinds of leases, flows from the agreement of
the parties. The fact that the oil and gas would have been the
lessor's personal property had there been no lease and had the
oil and gas been produced by him does not change the character of his relationship with the lessee or the nature of the
royalty payment as compensation for the use of land. Is
'Ve turn now to certain leases and agreements that differ in
various respects from the leases, orders, and permits considered above.
The Rancho Park Lease of Land Owned by the City of Los
Angeles.
[lSa] In 1946 the city assigned to the United States of
America" six and one-quarter percent (6% %) of the amount
lSPlaintiffs also suggest that the right to receive future rents is not
analOirouB to the right to receive future royalties beca.use the latter may
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or value of any oil and gas . . . that may be produced from
that certain property. . . . " In 1957 the city entered into a
35-year oil and gas lease with Signal Oil and Gas Company
and Richfield Oil Corporation as co-lessees. Under its terms
the lessees are required to pay the city a 1/5 royalty pws 50
percent of net profits after payout. The lease expressly provides that" the United States of America is the owner of six
and one-quarter per cent (614%) of the amount or value of
any oil and gas that may be produced from the demised
property except that used on the demised property, and
. . . the royalty of one-fifth (1/5) herein reserved . . . to the
Lessor includes such an amount or value."
Plaintiffs contend that any analogy between the ·royalty
payments to the United States and surface rentals of the type
involved ill the De Luz and 1'exas Co. cases is fallacious on
the ground that such royalty payments under the lease cannot
be classified as part of the purchase price paid by the lessees to
the United States. -We do not agree with this contention_ As a
, result of the 1946 assig-nment, which was made before the oil
I and gas lease was executed, the City of Los Angeles and the
United States of America were tenants in common in the
exclusive rigllt to drill for and produce oil and gas from the
land. (See Little v. Mounia'in View Dairies, Inc. (1950) 35
Ca1.2d 232, 234 [217 1'.2d 416] ; Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. V.
Walden, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 637, 649.) [19] TIle United
States did not sign the 1957 lease, but a single cotenant may
confer occupancy rights upon a third person. (Lee Chuck V.
Quan W 0 Chong & Co. (1891) 91 Cal. 593, 598-599 (28 P. 45] ;
Verdier v. Verdier (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 348,352 [313 P.2d
123].) [20] Furthermore, when one tenant in common
makes an oil and gas lease, it binds the other tenants in comon who ratify the lease, and acceptance of benefits under the
lease constitutes ratifieation. (Bessho v. General Petrole1(tI£
(!orp. (1921) 186 Cal. 133,141 [199 P. 22] ; see also Little v.
Mountain View Dai1-ies, Inc., in/pm, 35 Cal.2d 232, 235.)
he assigned ill pc'-petuity and may thereforc survive tllC oil and gas leases
!'xisting at the time of the assignment.. WIlen a landowner makes an oil
nntl gas lease 'lIld then assigns in perpetnity Ids right to rcceive r.yalty
pnYlllcnts, he eonw'ys his right to n'ccive ,-oyalty payments for thc period
of the lease and also part of his reversionary interest in the profit
/I /1/'c/1I1re_ (Cal/alum v. Mllrlill, supra, 3 Cal.2d 110, 124; DalnlCy-Jo7tn.,Iou O-H Corp. v. WuldclI, supm, 4 Cal.2d 637, 649; Schiffman V. Richfidt/ Oil Co. (W:\7) S Cal.:!t! 21 J. :!:l:l 164 1'.2<1 ] 081]; I.a Lai/ulla Runch
Co. v_ J)o<7!Je, slIpra, 18 Cal.2d ] :12, ] 36.) A lanllowncr who hns the right
to r"ceh-c rClltH frolll a snrfnce l!'llSC may also :lssign both Ilis right to
r('r('ivc ,-('nt and his revcrsionary intcr!'st.
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[lSb] Plaintiffs arc therefore obligated to make royalty payments to co-lessors instead of to a single lessor; their obligation to pay a 6% percent royalty to the United States constitutes part of the eonsideration for their right to produce oil
and gas from the land.
The Compensatory Royalty Agreement
[21] The State of California owns land adjacent to privately owned land upon which the Hancock Oil Company had
an oil and gas lease. Under the terms of the compensatory
royalty agreement, the state promised that it would not drill,
or permit others to drill, any well for the production of oil
and gas on its land; in return, Hancock agreed to pay the
state 1.448 percent of all oil produced and sold from wells
drilled under its lease on the adjoining privately owned land.
The state also grantrd Hancock an easement and rights of
way on the state-owned land, exercisable at any time for any
of Hancock's operatiolls 1,lllder its lease on the adjoining privately owned land.
Plaintiff Signal Oil and Gas Corporation, the successor in
interest to Hancock, contends that any analogy between the
royalty payments to the state and surface rentals of the type
involved in the De Luz and Texas Co. cases is fallacious on
the ground that payments under the compensatory royalty
agreement cannot be classified as part of the purchase price
for the right to produce oil and gas from privately owned
land. Under the compensatory royalty agreement, however,
Signal obtained interests in the state-owned land-the right
to exclude others from drilling any well for the production of
oil and gas on that land, and an easement and rights of way
over the land. The royalty payments are compensation for
those interests in land, and as such are analogous to rental
payments under the De Luz rule.
Drilling and Operating Contracts
In L.A. 29534, the trial court held invalid the assessments
of plaintiffs' interests under their drilling and operating contracts on the ground that the royalty interests should have
been deducted in making those assessments. Those contracts
are the Standard contract between plaintiff Standard Oil
Company and the Los Angeles County Flood Control District; the Termo contract between plaintiff Termo Company
and the Board of Harbor Commissioners of the City of Long
Beach, and the Humble contract between plaintiff Hunlble Oil
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& Refining Company and the Board of Harbor Commissioners
of the City of Long Beach. The trial court concluded that
('Mil contract crf'atrd a tenancy in common between the
parties in the respective taxable mineral interests, and that
plaillt ifl's were therefore erroneously taxed for property
owned in part by tax exempt entities.
[22a] 1. The Standard contract. Plaintiff Standard Oil
Company is the successor in interest of Continental Corporation, which entered into the Standard contract in 1939 for
"twenty (20) years . . . and so long thereafter as oil, gas
and/or other hydrocarbon substances is or are produced from
said lands in paying quantities." The instrument refers to
plaintiff as "contractor," and the preamble states that the
Los Angeles County Flood Control District "desires to
employ an~ engage contractor to drill, develop and operate"
for the recovery of hydrocarbons. Plaintiff agrees to drill and
operate a minimum of eigllt wells on sites it selects, and such
additional wells as in its judgment will properly drain the
land. Plaintiff has tll~ exclusive right to drill for and ·produce
oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons, and the exclusive right to
enter the land for such purposes and for construction and
maintenance of necessary equipment and structures. Plaintiff
may terminate drilling operations on all or any part of the
premises, subject only to termination of its rights respecting
that portion of the premises. It controls production, and may
comply with any regulation affecting production when, in its
judgment, such action is in the best interests of both parties.
It is authorized to incur a variety of expenses incident to the
accomplishment of the purposes of the agreement, but such
expenses are subject to reimbursement only from the proceeds
of the sale of production. It promises not to permit liens
against the premises and agrees to hold the district harmless
if any are filed, and it must provide liability and fire insurance. It has the right to take part in any litigation. All
hydrocarbons produced are the property of the district until
sold by it, and the parties specifically note their intent to
withhold from plaintiff any interest in the hydrocarbon products or the land.14 Plaintiff, however, has the exclusive right
and obligation to buy all the production from the district, at
14".A 1l oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons in, under or from the said
properties whether in place in the gronnd, in storage, or otherwise, shall
be and remain the property of District lit all times until Bold or otherwise
disposed of by or for it i it being the particular intent of the parties
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which time title passes to plaintiff. After deducting expenses
from the proceeds of sales, plaintiff agrees to pay the uistrict
a percentage of production as set forth in an attacheu schedule, "and shall retain the then balance as and for compensation for its services. . .. "
The Standard contract does not create a tenancy in common
in the taxable mineral interest in real property. [23] As
noted above, the taxable mineral interest consists of the right
to drill for and produce hydrocarbons. A tenancy in common
in that interest in real property exists only if both tenants
have a unity of possession in the same estate (Meyer v. Superior Oourt (1927) 200 Cal. 776, 792 [254 P. 1108] ; DabncyJohnston Oil Oorp. v. Walden, supra, 4 Cal.2d 637, 655), anu
the i:ntention to create such unity of possession must clearl.v
appear. (La Laguna Ranch 00. v. Dodge, supra, 18 Cal.2d
132, 138.) [24] When a landowner conveys to another the
exclusive right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons in
return for some part of the production or its cash equivalent,
he does not thereby become a tenant in common in the profit a
prendre, for he has not indicated an intention to :retain the
right to take part in the extraction of hydrocarbons. The
Standard contract grants plaintiff the exclusive right to drill
for and produce oil and gas and nowhere indicates that the
district intended to grant plaintiff less than the full profit a
prendre. [25] An agreement to share or retain title to the
oil and gas when reduced to possession does not constitute an
agreement to share the taxable mineral interest in the real
property.lIi [22b] The facts that the instrument is labelled
a drilling and operating agreement rather than a lease, that
plaintiff is labelled a contractor who is to be paid for services
performed, and that the parties disclaim any intent to grant
hereto that nothing in this agreement shall be construed to give to Contraetor, and that Contractor shall not under or by virtue of this agreement aequire, any interest in said lands nor in the oil, gas or other hydrocarbons produced therefrom."
lliThe Standard contract was the subject of litigation in County of Los
..4.ngeles v. Continental Corp. (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 207 [248 P.2d 157].
The court there rejected the argument that the title retention clause evidenced an intent to relegate the contractor to the position of an agent.
" 'Nor is it of any consequence that here the agreement undertakes to
provide that title to the products produced by the defendant shall remain
in the district until paid for by it. When considered in the light of the
provision that the defendant alone may purchase such produds and it i8
obligated so to do, this provision . . . would seem to be nothing more
than a method Or device designed to secure pnynH'nt to the district of
the royalty or rental herein reserved to it.' " (P. 227.)
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an interest in property, do not control the legal effect of the
instrument.16 Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding
invalid the assessments of plaintiff's interests under the Standard contract.
2. The Ternw and Humble Contracts. Plaintiff Termo Company entered into a drilling and operating agreement with the
Board of Harbor Commissioners of the City of Long Beach in
1939 to drill a well to drain land adjacent to that included in
a 1938 oil and gas permit. The parties combined all previous
agreements in an amended drilling and operating agreement
in 1961. The purpose of the 1961 amendment was to enable the
parties to commit the land, located within that segment of the
Wilmington Oil Field designated as Fault Block IV, to agreements with other holders of oil and gas interests whereby the
entire FauJt Block would be operated as one geological unit
by a 'single common agent.17 The amended agreement became
effective when the parties entered into a Unit Agreement and
a Unit Operating Agreement with other parties.
Plaintiff Humble Oil & Refining Company is the successor
ill interest to 'Vestgate-Greenland Oil Company, which entered into an oil and gas permit with the board in 1938 and
a drilling and operating agreement with the board in 1939,
and General American Oil Company of Texas, which entered
into an amended drilling and operating contract in 1961 in
contemplation of the commitment of the land to tne Fault
Block IV agreements. Humble subsequently signed the Unit
Agreement and Unit Operating Agreement.
The 1939 Termo drilling and operating agreement contains
many provisions similar to those in the Standard contract.
The agreement states that the city, having previously granted
16In County of Los Angeles v. Continental Oorp., 8'Upra, 113 Ca1.App.2d
207, 226, the court stated: " '. • • While denominated by the parties as
a "drilling and operating agreement" rather than as a lease, this is
of no particular significance, for it is elementary that the designation
which the parties to an agreement see fit to affix to it is not eon trolling
as to its legal effect. (Halll1ntnld Lbr. 00. v. County of LOB Angeles,
104 Cal.App. 235, 240 [285 P. 896].) Disregarding mere form, certain
it is tllnt it vests in the defendant the exclusive rigllt, for a term of
years, "to drill for alld produce oil and other substances" from beneath
the surface of the land tllerein described. In this aspect at least it differs
in no respect from the usual oil and gas lease and tile court concludes
that it is SUbstantially tile equivalent thereof.' "
17Ullit operation was required to repressurize the land within the Fault
Block by water injection in order to arrest or ameliorate land subsidence,
and to increase the maximum economic quantity of bydrocarbons ultimately recoveraLle by ending wasteful competitive drilling practices.
(See Pub. Resources Code, §§ 3315-3347.)
)
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Termo the exclusive right to drill for a.nd produce hydrocarbons, now employs Termo as an independent contractor to
drill and operate another well for a 25-year term. The parties
disclaim any intention of engaging Termo as anything but a
"contractor," or of granting Termo any interest in the land
or hydrocarbons produced. The city retains title to hydrocarbons until they are sold. Termo agrees either to provide a
purchaser for or to purchase itself all of the production. As
compensation for its services, the city agrees to pay Termo 40
percent of the consideration paid by purchasers of the hydrocarbons produced. The city's liability for payment ceases,
however, when it authorizes the purchaser to pay Tenno, and
all expenses of production are to be borne by Termo. Provisions follow dealing with written consent for assignment of
Termo's rights, mechanic's lieris, workmen's compensation,
insurance, and notice of litigation.
The 1939 agreement also contains several provisions tllat
are not included in the Standard contract. Termo agrees to
complete the original or any substitute well within 120 days
of the commencement of drilling operations uuless the city
gives written authorization for the continuance of operations.
The city may determine whether further drilling would be
unsuccessful and unproductive at the drillsite, and if it so
finds, may give written consent to the complete abandonment
of drilling operations without any requirement tha.t a substitute well be drilled. In the event of possible drainage, the city
may order Termo to open or perforate a well so as to produce
from additional zones, or to drill additional wells. The city
may prevent Termo from placing a casing into the bore-hole
of any well if it determines that such casing does not conform
to its specifications or if it disapproves of Termo's proposed
cementing and perforating program, and may submit the issue
to arbitration if no agreement is reached. The city may
assume control in extinguishing fires and controlling oil well
blowouts. Finally, Termo cannot alter the casing or producing
zone without the city's advance written consent.
The 1961 amendment to the Termo drilling and operating
contract extends the previous contracts for 25 years. The
amendment recites that the city has heretofore granted Termo
the exclusive right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons
from beneath specified lands, and that it is not feasible for
Termo to enter into Fault Block IV unit agreements without
first amending and modifying previous agreements. The
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amendIDent states, among other provisions not relevant here:
"4. EFFECT OF UNITIZATION. Said Contracts are hereby modified and amended to the extent necessary to make Said Contracts conform to all of the terms and conditions of Fault
Block IV United Agreements. 5. UNIT PARTICIPATION. All
present interests under Said Contracts are converted to a
working interest basis. City's interest under Said Contracts is
converted into sixty-five percent (65%) of the working interest in one hundred percent (100%) of the production of oil,
gas and other hydrocarbons allocated to Said Lands located in
Fault Block IV, and Contractors' interest under Said Contracts is converted into thirty-five percent (35%) of the working interest in one hundred percent (100%) of the production
of oil, gas and other hydrocarbons allocated to Said IJands
located in Fault Block IV."18
The 1961 Humble amended drilling and operating contract
integrates all previous contracts between Humble and the
city. It contains provisions substantial1y similar to the provisions of the 1961 amendment to.theTermo drilling and operating agreement and to those provisions of the 1939 Termo
agreement that resemble the provisions of the Standard contract. 11 In addition, the city's written approval of proposed
drillsites selected by Humble is required. In conducting operations for the joint account of the parties, Humble may only
make such surveys and tests, and land and place such well
casing, as both parties agree upon. No well may be drilled,
redrilled, reworked, plugged back, deepened, or altered without the consent of both parties. After Humble's refusal to
join in any such operation, however, the city may do such
laThe recital to the amended contract also states: "It is the desire of
the parties that City's present interest under Said Contracts "ill be eonverted into sixty-five percent (650/0) of the working interest in one hundred percent (1000/0) of thc working interest in Said Lands, and Contractor's interest undcr Said Contracts will be converted into thirty-five
percent (350/0) of the working interest in one hundred percent (100%)
of the working interest in Said Lands and Contractors will advance City's
sixty-five percent (65%) of the expenses as a working interest owner and
will be reimbursed therefor out of one bundred percent (1000/0) of the
production of oil, gas and othcr hydrocarbon substances allocated to Said
Lands. . • . "
19Some minor differences should bc noted. Humble agrees to drill and
operate fourteen wells and such additional wells as are authorized. The
city retains title to hydrocarbons underlying the land until recovered,
subject to Humble's exclusive rigllt to drill for, produce, and take the
same, and to the city's rights of ownership when produced. .As compensation for its services, Humble receives 35 percent of production; 65 percent of Humble'. expenses are payable out of the city'. share of production.
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work at its own expense. Humble has similar rights to drill or
conduct other major operations without the city's consent,
but only if fewer than 14 wells are open to production. If
eitller party contends that a redrilling or other major operation will jeopardize existing production, the matter may be
submitted to arbitration. No well may be plugged or abandoned without the consent of both parties. Equipment, personal property, and fixtures are owned jointly by the parties,
65 percent by the city and 35 percent by Humble, and Humble cannot sell or dispose of such items without the city's
prior written consent.
The Unit Agreement signed in 1961 by the city, plaintiffs,
and other parties defines "working interest" to mean "any
interest, . . . held in lands by virtue of fee title, including
lands held in trust, or by virtue of any lease, operating agreement or otherwise, under or pursuant to which the owner of .
such interest has the right to drill for, develop and produce
oil and gas. For the purposes of this agreement a Working
Interest shall be deemed to be vested in the owner thereof
even though his right to drill or produce may be delegated to
a Field Contractor, or an operator under a drilling and operating agreement . . . or other type of agreement." Section
4.3 of the Unit Agreement provides that "Working Interest
Owners through the Unit Coordinator or the Unit Operators
shall have the right to conduct such operations as they may
from time to time Approve as necessary or desirable to produce efficiently and economically the Unitized Substances, to
increase the ultimate recovery of Unitized Substances, to prevent waste, or to contribute to the possible arrest or amelioration of Subsidence, including but not limited to Repressuring
Operations in and with respect to the Unitized Formations.
• • .' '20 The powers of the Unit Operator as set forth in the
Unit Agreement and the Unit Operating Agreement include
20Section 8.2 of the Unit Agreement further provides that, except for
the right to erect noninterfering facilities for taking oil in kind, ". . .
no Person other than the Working Interest Owners, acting through the
Unit Coordinator and Unit Operators, shall have any right by reason
of this agreement or the Unit Operating Agreement to conduct any oper·
ations or install any facilities on any Committed Tract. . . . " Section 4.1
of the Unit Operating Agreement provides: "The Working Interest
Owners shall exercise over·all supervision and control of all matters pertaining to the repressuring, development and operation [of t.he unitized
Jands] . . . and shall make such Determinations and grant such Approvals as they may deem appropriate for the supervision and direction
of the Unit Coordinator and the Unit Operators."
•
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"the exclusive right to develop and operate the Unit Segment
designated for it in the Unit Operating Agreement in accordance with the provisions thereof," the right "to enter into
such agreements as are desirable or necessary to carry out the
purposes" of the Unit Agreement,21 and the right, subject
to approval of the working interest owners, to "employ its
own tools and equipment in the drilling or redrilling of Unit
Wells. . . . " Matters to be voted on by working interest
owners include all aspects of exploration, development, and
produetion. 22 The prescribed voting procedure gives each
working interest owner a voting interest equal to its percentage interest in the entire tract committed to unit operations.
Most of the provisions of the 1939 Termo drilling and operating agreement are substantially similar to the provisions of
the Standard contract, and do not indicate any intent to
create a tenancy in common in the taxable mineral interest. 23
[26] Amicus curiae contends, however, that the provisions
of the 1939 Termo agreement that are not contained in the
Standard contract and the provisions of the 1961 Humble
agreement that are not contained in the Standard contract
and that do not relate to unitization indicate a sharing of
responsibilities for exploration, development, and production
even prior to unitization. Amicus Curiae further contends
that the provisions and agreements relating to unitization
demonstrate an intent to create tenancies in common in the
taxable mineral interest.
We do not agree that the provisions of the Termo agreement and the Humble agreement that do not relate to unitiza21The Unit Operator may enter agreements to repressure or maintain
pressures within the unitized formations, to prevent oil or gas migration,
to prevent dminage or waste, and •• to permit the use of any lands or
facilities for oil and gas operations by or in conjunction with any other
Persons, " as well as for other purposes.
22The matteI's to he approved or determined by the working interest
owners include the kind, character and method of unit operations and rate
of production; the type, method, and length of repressuring operations;
any expenditure over $20,000; the drilling, repair, abandonment, or
alteration of any unit well; and the negotiation, execution, and performance of agreements necessary or desirable for the performallce of the
Unit Agreement.
23 Amicus curiae contends that the provisions for purchase or sale of
the oil and gas produced and the express retention of title to such hydrocarbons by the city show clear intention to create a tenancy in common
in the taxable mineral interest because the city retains rights normally
granted to a lessee. The rights to hydrocarbons when produced that are
retained by the city, however, do not detract from the taxable mineral
estate, namely, the exelusive right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons
. from beneath the surface of public lands for a term of years.
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tion indicate an intention to create tenancies in common in
the taxable mineral interests. They indicate instead an int('ntion to grant plaintiffs a profit a prendre subjeet to conditions
and controls retained by the city to assure that publicly
owned oil resources are developed in a manner that will best
serve the public interest. The taxable mineral inter('st consists
of the right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons. Thc
instruments grant that interest exclusively to plaintiffs for a
25-year period, with a reversion thereafter to the city.
Although the controls retained by the city allow it to supervise operations for its own protection, they do not allow it to
undertake such operations itself.24 Retention of opcrational
checks adequate to assure maximum public benefit from private development of public resources is common. We note, for
example, that the California Public Resources Code requires
the state to include similar provisions in state oil and gas
leases. (See Pub. Resources Code, §§ 6829, 6830.) Such controls serve not only to maximize return to the public, but also
to assure that public land leased to private individuals will
continue to serve a publie purpose. (See, e.g., Health & Saf.
Code, §§ 33336, 33439; City & County 01 Ban Francisco v.
Ross (1955) 44 Ca1.2d 52,57-58 [279 P.2d 529] ; Ventura Port
Dist. v. Taxpayers etc. Ventura Port Dist. (1959) 53 Cal.
2d 227,234-235 [1 Cal.Rptr.169, 347 P.2d 305].)
[27] We conclude, however, that the unit agreements and
the provisions of the 1961 instruments that refer to unitization create tenancies in common in the respective taxable
mineral interests in land. By those instruments and provisions the city adjusted its relationship with each of the plaintiffs involved so that the previously granted exclusive rights
to drill for and produce oil and gas would be delegated to a
common agent. That agent's operations are subject to control
by vote of "working interest" owners, both the city and the
24Paragraph 7 of the Humble contract provides that if Humble refuse>!
to drill, redrill, rework, deepen, plug blll!k, or alter a well, the eity may
carry out the operation at its own expense. If tbe city elects to drill 11
well, Humble agrees to operate the· well, and to surrender its sbare of
the bydrocarbons produced until its share of dl'illillg expenses bas been
recovered. Provisions for redrilling and. otber operations include the right
to arbitration if either party feels tbat tbe source of supply from whieb
the well is then producing will be shut off or jeopardized. Considered in
the context of the entire contract, the provisions of paragraph 7 merely
provide another control provision in the e\'ent that Humble fails to meet
its obligation to maximize prouuction from the tract, and are not meant
to create a tenancy in common in the taxable mineral interest.
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plaintiff involved are working interest owners, and both vote
in proportion to their adjustcd interests and their relative
interests in the entire tract committed to unit operation. The
right to drill for and produce oil and gas, which comprises the
taxable mineral interest, is no longer held exclusively by a
single oil contractor. Rather, both the plaintiff involved and
the city control the drilling and production of oil and gas on
the subject land in proportion to their voting rights in the
unit, and each has subscribed to that unity of possession
required to create a tenancy in common in the taxable mineral
estate.
Defendants contend, however, that as between the city and
each of the plaintiffs involved, the plaintiff continued to own
the entire profit a prendre, and that it is only for unit purposes that each party votes in proportion to its unit participation. Defendants urge that the purpose of unitization is to
prevent subsidence and that the voting arrangements created
by the unit agreements were intended to give the city a voice
within the unit only to protect the public interest in the
cnrrying out of the ullitization program. Defendants conclude
that ullitization should not affect the taxable property interests of the parties. Although some provisions of the unit
agreements indicate the wish of the parties to avoid tax conse- __
qnences, to achieve unitization they agreed to share full control over the right to drill for and produce hydrocarbons, the
right that comprises the taxable mineral estate. Accordingly,
the trial court correctly concluded that the city became a
tenant in common with Termo and Humble and that the latters' interests should be assessed accordingly.
The part of the judgment in L.A. 29534 dealing with the
assessments of interests under the Standard contract is
reversed and the trial court is directed to amend its findings
of fact and conclusions of law in accord with the views
expressed herein and to enter judgment for defendaqts as to
those assessments. In all other respects the judgment in L.A.
29534 is affirmed. The judgment in L.A. 29535 is affirmed.
Dcfendants shall recover their costs on these appeals.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.
The petition of the plaintiffs and appellants for a rehearillg
was denied December 18, 1968.
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